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Abstract
This paper studies the drivers of business funded and performed R&D in a panel
of 14 OECD countries since 1981. More specifically, we investigate the e↵ects of pub-
lic R&D related policies and wage formation. Following Pesaran (Econometrica, 2006)
and Kapetanios et al. (Journal of Econometrics, 2011), our empirical strategy allows
for cross-sectionally correlated error terms due to the presence of unobserved common
factors, which are potentially non-stationary. We find that tax incentives are e↵ective.
Public funding (subsidization) of R&D performed by firms can also be e↵ective if subsi-
dies are not too low, neither too high. R&D performed within the government sector and
within institutions of higher education is basically neutral with respect to business R&D.
We find no evidence for crowding out, nor for complementarity. Using an indicator for
wage pressure developed by Blanchard (Economic Policy, 2006), we find that wage moder-
ation may contribute to innovation, but only in fairly closed economies and in economies
with flexible labour markets. In highly open economies and economies with rigid labour
markets rather the opposite holds. In these economies high wage pressure may enhance
creative destruction and force firms to innovate as competitive strategy. Our results show
that a careful treatment of the properties of the data is crucial.
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1 Introduction
Ageing and rising pressure on the welfare state force all OECD countries to develop e↵ective
employment and growth policies. When it comes to long-run growth, both the theoretical
and empirical literature recognize investment in research and development (R&D) as a major
factor (see Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe, Helpman,
and Ho↵maister, 2009). Numerous studies have therefore investigated the determinants of
business investment in R&D in many countries, both at the micro and the macro level.
Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (1997, 2003) were the first to provide an explanation at the
macro level in a panel of 17 OECD countries. In their seminal paper, they paid particular
attention to the role of public policies organized to stimulate private R&D investment i.e.
tax incentives, public funding of R&D projects in the business sector, expenditures on R&D
within the government sector and R&D spending in institutions of higher education.
Our research is inspired by two gaps in the empirical macro literature on the drivers of
business R&D. A first one relates to the impact of wage formation. Today, OECD countries
are not only called upon to develop e↵ective growth policies, but also to create jobs and to
raise employment rates. To reach this goal, many countries adopt outspoken wage moderation
policies. Interestingly, these policies also a↵ect incentives and available resources for firms to
innovate and invest in R&D. On the employer side, it is often argued that wage moderation is
an important factor to maintain firm profitability, which is a key condition for investment in
R&D. Several researchers have, however, argued that an excessive focus on wage moderation
may kill incentives to innovate (e.g Kleinknecht, 1998). Wage moderation may for example
increase the survival probability of the least innovative firms and retard the process of creative
destruction. Weighing on the purchasing power of households, outspoken wage moderation
may also lead to lower demand-driven innovations as demand for new products and services
falls. Conversely, higher wage pressure may force firms to innovate as a key element in
their competitive strategy. To the best of our knowledge, despite its theoretical importance,
rigorous cross-country empirical work on these conflicting hypotheses has never been done.
A second gap in the existing empirical macro literature on the determinants of R&D invest-
ment is methodological. A key characteristic of new technology and knowledge is that it may
spillover to other firms and countries, so that all may benefit from an improvement in the world
level of technology, although not necessarily to the same extent (Coe, Helpman, and Ho↵-
maister, 2009; Everaert, Heylen, and Schoonackers, 2015). Eberhardt, Helmers, and Strauss
(2013) have shown that these spillovers a↵ect firms’ private returns to R&D and therefore
business R&D investment. A crucial econometric issue, however, follows from the fact that
the world level of technology and knowledge is largely unobserved. Technology spillovers will
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then manifest themselves in standard panel R&D regressions as cross-sectional dependence
in the error terms, induced by an unobserved common factor. Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe
(1997, 2003) and subsequent macro research (e.g. Falk, 2006; Westmore, 2014) have neglected
this issue. If omitted common factors are correlated with the included explanatory variables,
estimated parameters will be biased and inconsistent. Even worse, when unobserved common
factors are non-stationary, standard estimators yield spurious results.
Our contribution in this paper is to study the determinants of business funded and per-
formed R&D in 14 OECD countries in the period 1981-2012, with a special focus on the role of
wage formation and by adopting an empirical strategy that deals with cross-sectionally corre-
lated error terms due to the presence of unobserved common factors. For the set of countries
in our empirical analysis, Figure 1 shows the data for business funded and performed R&D,
expressed in real per capita terms and in 2010 PPP dollars. Huge cross-country di↵erences
stand out, both in the level and in the evolution of R&D, making an empirical analysis highly
relevant. Next to the role of wage pressure, we also test the impact of public policies organ-
ised to stimulate private R&D investment, in line with Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003).
To estimate our model, we use the common correlated e↵ects pooled (CCEP) estimator of
Pesaran (2006). This estimator controls for unobserved common factors by adding cross-
sectional averages of the data. As shown by Kapetanios, Pesaran, and Yamagata (2011), this
approach is also valid in a non-stationary panel context.
Our main findings are the following. First of all, we learn from our results that a careful
treatment of the properties of the data is crucial. The empirical analysis reveals significant
cross-sectional correlation in levels and in first-di↵erences for most variables. All variables
are also found to be non-stationary. For most variables the non-stationarity is induced by
an (unobserved) common factor. The use of the CCEP estimator is therefore highly justi-
fied. Second, the e↵ects of wage pressure are significant but not uniform. We find that in
economies where firms face relatively little (foreign) competition and dispose of flexibility to
adjust their employed labour force because employment protection legislation is soft, high
wage pressure has negative e↵ects on private R&D expenditures. In open economies where
firms face sharp (foreign) competition and run their activities in a rather rigid and regulated
labour environment, however, the opposite seems to happen. In such economies - think of
many European economies - firms that do not innovate cannot survive when wage pressure is
high. Rising wages thus enhance creative destruction and force all firms to innovate as com-
petitive strategy. Third, our empirical analysis reveals various ways in which governments
can e↵ectively promote business R&D investment. We observe that both tax incentives and
public funding (subsidization) of R&D projects in the business sector can work, if chosen
carefully. This condition applies in particular to public funding. For this policy instrument,
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we confirm an earlier finding of Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) that the relationship
between subsidization and private R&D expenditures is inverted U-shaped. That is, subsidies
encourage private firms to raise their own R&D spending if these subsidies are not too low
neither too high. The optimal subsidization rate may be somewhere between 6 % and 10
%. The results also show that the available stock of human capital is an important driver
of business R&D investment implying that governments should invest in schooling in order
to increase the percentage of population with a higher degree. Furthermore, we find that
R&D investment within the government sector and within universities will also have positive
e↵ects on aggregate R&D spending. Most of our results predict a one-to-one e↵ect from
higher spending within the public sector to aggregate R&D. In other words, neither the idea
that public R&D would crowd out private R&D spending, nor the idea of complementarity
between the two, find support in our results.
Our focus on aggregate private R&D investment in this paper is not common in the liter-
ature. In comparative perspective, many more studies have investigated R&D expenditures
at the firm or the industry level (see e.g. the survey in David, Hall, and Toole, 2000, and our
overview of the literature in Section 2). Yet, there are very good reasons why an analysis of
macroeconomic data is important. A first one relates to the indirect e↵ects or externalities
of policies. For example, if individual firms benefit from R&D investment subsidies, this may
boost their innovation activity. At the same time, however, also other firms may be a↵ected.
Competing firms may su↵er because of the advantage given to a direct competitor. Due
to falling rates of return they may reduce their R&D investment. Conversely, downstream
customers in the supply chain may benefit from knowledge spillovers induced by the inno-
vating firm. They may raise their R&D investment. Similar externalities can occur between
industries (Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe, 2003). The potential presence of these external
e↵ects makes the case for an empirical analysis at the macro level. A second reason follows
from the observation that (firms in) di↵erent industries may react di↵erently to changes in
the drivers of R&D, for example because market environment and institutions are di↵erent.
In that sense, the response of R&D investment to rising wage pressure may be di↵erent in
manufacturing sectors than in services. For policy makers it will be highly interesting also to
know what the response is at the aggregate level.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a brief survey of
the literature on public policy instruments to encourage business R&D investment, and on
their e↵ects. This section also reviews the conflicting hypotheses regarding the influence of
wage formation on innovation. Section 3 discusses important properties of the data and sets
out the empirical model. This section also discusses the econometric methodology. In Section
4 we report our estimation results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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Figure 1: Business financed and performed R&D expenditures in 14 OECD countries
(real per capita, 2010 PPP dollars)
(a) Euro area countries
0 
200 
400 
600 
800 
1000 
1200 
 1981  1986  1991  1996  2001  2006  2011 
Austria Belgium 
France Italy 
Netherlands Spain 
(b) Nordic countries
0 
200 
400 
600 
800 
1000 
1200 
 1981  1986  1991  1996  2001  2006  2011 
Denmark Finland 
Norway Sweden 
(c) Anglo-Saxon countries
0 
200 
400 
600 
800 
1000 
1200 
 1981  1986  1991  1996  2001  2006  2011 
Australia Canada 
United Kingdom United States 
5
2 Drivers of private R&D intensity: literature
Boosting R&D intensity is one of the top priorities of OECD countries today. The Europe
2020 targets include that 3% of the EU’s GDP has to be invested in R&D and innovation
(public and private combined) by 2020. To stimulate private R&D intensity, governments have
di↵erent instruments at their disposal. These instruments are used to o↵set market failure in
the allocation of resources to long-term and risky investment, which are key characteristics
of R&D investment. As a result, private investment in R&D is mostly lower than socially
optimal, thus justifying government support.
Section 2.1 discusses existing public policy instruments and some of the empirical evidence
on their impact. In Section 2.2. we review the literature regarding the e↵ects of wage forma-
tion and some underlying labour market characteristics on R&D investment and innovation.
Various countries have institutionalized wage moderation or wage control mechanisms in the
second half of the 1980s or early 1990s. Other countries have decentralized wage bargain-
ing and introduced legislation to reduce union power, also contributing to wage moderation.
While most will agree that these policies have positive e↵ects on employment and compet-
itiveness, at least in the short run, their possible long-run e↵ects on a country’s innovative
capacity occur much less clear. In our discussion of the arguments for and against wage mod-
eration, we also pay attention to the potential impact of the institutional environment within
which wage formation takes place. We end with a brief explanation of the role of product
market characteristics.
2.1 Public policy instruments
Traditionally, R&D policy can be subdivided in direct support (such as public sector R&D
and direct R&D subsidies) and indirect support (such as R&D tax incentives). In addition,
governments may also provide support for the university research system and the formation
of high-skilled human capital as for formal R&D cooperation between institutions. In this
section, we point at existing, mostly empirical, evidence on the impact of policy support
measures on private R&D expenditures.
Public sector R&D and government funding of R&D in the business sector
Among the most frequently used public policy instruments to support R&D are public sector
R&D and government funding of private investment in R&D. The former refers to direct
R&D expenditures by public research institutions (intramural) and universities. The latter
may either take the form of grants or subsidies, where the results of the R&D belong to the
private performer, or it may concern funding aimed at the procurement of R&D, where the
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results belong to a recipient that is not necessarily the performer. An important question in
the literature is whether these instruments are e↵ective tools to stimulate private investment
in R&D, or not. On the one hand, the public sector can stimulate private investment in R&D
by lowering the cost of research for the industry. One way to achieve this is by conducting basic
risk research (where the wedge between private and social returns is probably the highest)
and by making its results publicly available. It can also be done more directly by providing
resources that lift potential cash constraints in private firms or by providing a bu↵er when
high financial risk is involved. Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003), however, see three
reasons why one may question the e↵ectiveness of public spending on R&D. As a worst case
scenario, public spending may even crowd out private R&D. First, government spending on
R&D may increase the demand for researchers, which may raise these researchers’ wages and
make private R&D investment more expensive. This potential source of crowding out is most
likely to occur if there is a shortage in the most decisive factor of the R&D process. That
is if high-skilled labour is scarce. Second, public sector money can act as a substitute to
private money. In other words, governments may execute or subsidize projects that would
have been implemented anyway such that the same investment is performed with public
instead of private money, without any increase in total R&D. Third, the allocation of funds
by the government generally occurs less e ciently than by market forces, thereby distorting
competition and resource allocation.
As to the empirical evidence on the e↵ects of R&D in the public sector, Goolsbee (1998),
for the United States, finds evidence of crowding out of private funding through raising wages
of scientists and engineers. Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) (their Table III) report
results for a panel of 17 OECD countries that are consistent with this observation. According
to their findings, a one euro increase in R&D expenditures within the government sector tends
to imply a 0.38 euro decline in business expenditures in the long run. Although this supports
the hypothesis of crowding out, the net aggregate e↵ect of intramural government R&D would
still seem to be positive. That is, crowding out is only partial. As to R&D expenditures in
universities, Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) find an e↵ect on private spending that
is basically zero, leaving an aggregate net e↵ect of 1. Falk (2006), on the other hand, finds
indications of a significant positive impact of R&D in the higher education sector on business
R&D.
When it comes to the e↵ects of direct funding by the government of R&D in the private
sector, David, Hall, and Toole (2000) report that one third of available, mostly firm-level,
studies find substitution e↵ects. Overall the authors conclude that the empirical literature
is inconclusive about the net impact of public R&D subsidies. Falk (2006) and Bassanini
and Ernst (2002) are also inconclusive or report negligible e↵ects. By contrast, Guellec and
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Van Pottelsberghe (2003) find that the net long-run impact of R&D subsidies on private R&D
investment is positive. A one euro increase in government funded R&D in the business sector
would induce an additional 0.7 euro of private spending. Finally, Lach (2002) also finds that
public R&D subsidies stimulate private R&D expenditures in the long run.
In general, more recent research tends to find less evidence for crowding out and concludes
in favour of additionality e↵ects of public R&D subsidies (see for instance Duguet, 2004;
Carboni, 2011; Czarnitzki and Hussinger, 2004; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Hussinger, 2008;
Cerulli and Poti, 2012; Oezcelik and Taymaz, 2008; Bloch and Graversen, 2012). The e↵ects
of R&D subsidies need not be homogeneous, however. For instance, Jaumotte and Pain
(2005) show that on a firm level the positive e↵ect of R&D subsidies is more pronounced
when firms are cash-constrained. In fact, there is broader empirical evidence that public
subsidies are more e↵ective drivers of R&D in small (financially constrained) firms. In the
same spirit Czarnitzki and Ebersberger (2010) underscore the importance of aimed targeting
of subsidies. These authors observe that in many cases most funding is awarded to larger
firms that would have performed the R&D even in the absence of the public subsidy. Some
studies also report heterogeneity in e↵ects depending on the size of public subsidies. Guellec
and Van Pottelsberghe (2003), for instance, find an inverted U-shape, where the strongest
positive e↵ects on private R&D can be observed for public subsidy rates of 4 11 %, while rates
that are too high (>20%) tend to generate negative (crowding-out) e↵ects. Gorg and Strobl
(2007) confirm these findings. Becker (2014) concludes that this non-linear e↵ect suggests
that it could be more e↵ective to provide intermediate support levels to a larger number of
firms than a large amount of support to fewer firms.
R&D tax incentives
The policy mix aimed at stimulating business R&D and innovation has seen growing use of
R&D tax incentives. Such measures are indirect since the decision to use them, and the
decision on how to use them, remain with the company. They are thus considered to be more
market-oriented than for instance direct subsidies. Companies investing in R&D are eligible
to claim tax reductions against their payable tax (Warda, 2001). As such, R&D tax incentives
reduce the marginal cost of R&D spending and are also more neutral (i.e. less distortive) than
direct R&D subsidies. In general, while direct subsidies are more targeted towards long-term
research, R&D tax schemes are more likely to encourage short-term applied research and
boost incremental innovation rather than radical breakthroughs (EC, 2003; OECD, 2014).
Fiscal incentives for R&D may take on various forms such as R&D tax credits, which are
present in countries such as France, Belgium and the UK (OECD, 2014; EC, 2003). These
tax credits are deducted from the corporate income tax and are applicable either to the level
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of R&D expenditures or to the increase in these expenditures with respect to a given base.
Alternatively, some countries, such as Canada, Denmark and the UK, allow for the immediate
or accelerated depreciation of investment in machinery, equipment, and buildings devoted to
R&D activities (Warda, 2013; Falk, 2006). Finally, tax incentives need not necessarily apply
to the corporate income tax, but may also apply to the personal income tax, as in the
Netherlands and Belgium, or to the value added tax (or other taxes such as consumption,
land or property) (OECD, 2014).
An often used indicator reflecting the overall generosity of R&D tax incentives in a country
is the so-called B-index (Warda, 2001). It is a composite index that is computed as the present
value of income before taxes necessary to cover the initial cost of R&D investment and to pay
the corporate income tax so that it becomes profitable to perform research activities (Warda,
2001). Algebraically, the B-index is equal to the after-tax cost of a one euro expenditure
on R&D divided by one minus the corporate income tax rate. The after-tax cost is the net
cost of investing in R&D, taking account of all available tax incentives (corporate income tax
rates, R&D tax credits and allowances, depreciation rates). The more favourable a country’s
tax treatment of R&D investment, the lower its B-index.
Hall and Van Reenen (2000) find that most studies in the pre 2000 literature show positive
e↵ects of fiscal incentives on R&D expenditures. More recent research into the e↵ectiveness
of tax credits is even more unanimous in concluding that there are positive R&D e↵ects
(Becker, 2014). For instance, both Bloom, Gri th, and Van Reenen (2002) and Guellec
and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) find significant negative coe cients on the B-index in their
regressions explaining business R&D expenditures. Bloom, Gri th, and Van Reenen (2002)
estimate that a 10% tax cut induced fall in the cost of R&D induces just over a 1% rise in
the level of R&D in the short run, and just under a 10% rise in R&D in the long run. That
is, they find a long-run elasticity of R&D with respect to the user cost of just below 1. Long-
run elasticities vary between modest estimates of  0.14 (Bernstein and Mamuneas, 2005;
Baghana and Mohnen, 2009) to  1.5 and over (as in Harris, Li, and Trainor, 2009; Parisi and
Sembenelli, 2003). Most studies, however, find elasticities in between these extremes (Lokshin
and Mohnen, 2012; Koga, 2003; Mulkay and Mairesse, 2013).
Knowledge spillovers from the university research system and the formation of
high-skilled human capital
Governments may resort to other than the traditional policy instruments to support pri-
vate R&D expenditures. Some recent studies indicate the relevance of knowledge spillovers
from university research to firms, enhancing technological opportunities and the productivity
of private R&D, for example through personal interactions, university spin-o↵s and consul-
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tancy. Most empirical studies on this topic indeed find positive (geographically localized)
knowledge externalities from university research to private R&D (see for instance Ja↵e, 1989;
Autant-Bernard, 2001; Karlsson and Andersson, 2009). Policies may thus aim to facilitate
and support the formation of regional clusters of university and private R&D activity to ex-
ploit agglomeration economies. An important role in this context is played by the (increased)
availability of high-skilled personnel trained by universities. Some studies do indeed find im-
portant positive R&D e↵ects of high-skilled human capital resources1. Education policies and
human capital investment thus also have a role in increasing private R&D.
2.2 Wage formation, labour and product market characteristics and inno-
vation
The monitoring of wage formation is an important feature of many OECD countries’ economic
policy as it has a direct impact on employment and a country’s competiveness. Expected
positive e↵ects on employment generally underlie arguments in favour of wage moderation
(see e.g. Bovenberg, 1997). Lower wages may increase firm profitability, generating more
resources for investment. They may improve the competitiveness of domestic firms and raise
exports. And they may make production more labour intensive. It then comes as no surprise
that in many European countries wage moderation policies have become institutionalized.
Germany’s success is currently often taken as guiding inspiration (Heylen and Buyse, 2012).
An important additional element, especially from a long-run perspective, is the possible
impact of wage formation on a country’s innovative capacity. If high (excessive) wages re-
duce R&D investment, their negative e↵ects on employment and competitiveness would be
multiplied. On the other hand, if wage pressure promotes innovation, negative e↵ects on com-
petitiveness would be limited to the short run, whereas in the long run competitiveness and
employment would rise. Theoretical arguments in favour of wage moderation come mostly
from an employer perspective. That is, wage moderation would imply higher profits which
can subsequently be spent on innovation activities.
If a focus on wage restraint is missing, rents from innovation may be appropriated by
unions through higher wage claims. This may reduce firms’ willingness and resources to
innovate. An early statement of this argument was the so-called hold-up problem under
incomplete contracts (Grout, 1984; Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen, 2003). In more recent
work, Ulph and Ulph (1994) confirm this argument in a right-to-manage model where unions
1Variables that are considered are the availability of highly qualified scientists and engineers (Adams,
Chiang, and Starkey, 2001; Adams, Chiang, and Jensen, 2003; Becker and Pain, 2008), the share of the
number of workers with higher education in the total number of workers (Garcia and Mohnen, 2010), the share
of the population with tertiary education in the total working age population (Wang, 2010) and the years of
formal schooling (Kanwar and Evenson, 2003).
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and firms bargain only over the wage. The main factor driving firms in their innovation e↵orts
in their model is the expected di↵erence between the profits that the firm can earn once it
has successfully innovated and the profits that it would earn otherwise. In this setup high
(excessive) wages represent a ’tax’ that unions impose on the investment and the success of
the firm. Lower R&D investment would be the result. Conversely, a focus on wage moderation
would imply higher R&D. Other authors, however, have challenged this expectation (see e.g.
Kleinknecht, 1994, 1998; Kleinknecht and Naastepad, 2004). One of their main arguments is
that wage restraint raises the survival probability of low-productive firms and non-innovators,
slowing down the process of creative destruction. In a regime of wage increases and wage
pressure, by contrast, the balance would shift and lack of innovation would no longer - or
much less - be an option. In the framework of Ulph and Ulph (1994), this argument would
imply that high wage pressure no longer reduces, but raises the profit di↵erential between
innovating and not innovating. The reason is the very negative outcome in the non-innovating
case. Intuitively, this idea raises a number of interesting extensions. One would expect this
positive e↵ect of high wage pressure to exist mainly in a very competitive environment and
when firms lack the flexibility to adjust their (expensive) labour force. What we have in mind
are very open economies and/or economies with highly deregulated product markets, but a
very regulated labour market (e.g. extensive employment protection legislation). It will be
exactly in such an environment that high wages and lack of innovation imply huge losses and
the risk of bankruptcy. In these economies innovation will be firms’ only possible competitive
strategy.
Theory being inconclusive, what do we know about the impact of wage moderation on
innovation and R&D empirically? First of all, it must be said that existing empirical work
directly relating wage formation and innovation is very scarce. Most studies that analyse
the e↵ect of labour markets on innovation focus on aspects of numerical flexibility, such as
the existence of flexible employment contracts, or functional flexibility such as the possi-
bility of outsourcing or temporary employment. For instance, Bassanini and Ernst (2002)
have estimated the impact of labour market regulation on the industry’s R&D intensity in
a cross-section of 18 manufacturing industries and 18 OECD countries. More recently, Mur-
phy, Siedschlag, and McQuinn (2012) examined the impact of the strictness of employment
protection legislation on innovation intensity in the OECD. Univocal results are hard to find.
Observed e↵ects depend on the system of industrial relations and the characteristic of indus-
tries. We know of only one study that has directly analysed the impact of wage changes on
innovation. Pieroni and Pompei (2008) find, for a panel of Italian manufacturing industries,
that wage increases are positively related to the number of patents (their proxy for innova-
tion). However, the authors only look at absolute wages and do not include an adequate
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measure of wage pressure (wage moderation) as we will do (See Section 3.1.1).
Next to the impact of labour market institutions, a growing number of researchers have
studied the role of product market characteristics (in particular product market competition)
on innovation. In a highly cited contribution, Aghion, Bloom, Gri th, and Howitt (2005) put
forward an inverted U-shaped relationship between the degree of competition and investment
in innovation. The argument goes as follows. When competition is low to begin with, the
economy is expected to consist of a higher fraction of sectors with ’neck-and-neck’ competing
firms. Product market deregulation will induce these neck-and-neck firms to innovate in
order to escape competition, since the incremental value of getting ahead rises in the degree of
competition. When competition is high to begin with, however, the economy will have a higher
fraction of sectors with one technological leader and many laggards. Further deregulation then
has negative e↵ects on innovation. Since more competition reduces the net rent that can be
captured by laggards who succeed in catching up, the incentives for them to try will get
weaker. This is the Schumpeterian e↵ect of more competition. Although our focus in this
paper is not on product market characteristics, we will control for them in our empirical work.
Moreover, as we have mentioned above, the degree of product market competition may also
be a factor that changes the e↵ect of wage pressure on firms’ investment in R&D.
3 Empirical analysis
Our empirical analysis follows Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) and relies on a simple
R&D investment model that considers real per capita business sector funded and performed
R&D (BERDit) to be a function of a mix of policy instruments (POLICYit), discussed in
Section 2, and of real per capita value added generated by the business sector (V Ait). We
further build on Falk (2006) and allow for other possible determinants (Zit) driving private
R&D investment. Finally, we explicitly investigate the possible impact of wage formation
(WAGEit) on BERDit,
BERDit = f(V Ait, POLICYit, Zit,WAGEit), (1)
where subscripts i and t respectively denote the ith country and tth period. The exact
functional form for equation (1) will depend on the discussion of the properties of the data
in Section 3.1.3.
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3.1 A first look at the data
3.1.1 Data and sources
We analyse the determinants of real per capita business sector funded and performed R&D
for a group of 14 OECD countries2 using yearly data over the period 1981-2012. An overview
of the construction of all data and their sources can be found in Appendix C.
When focusing on our sample of countries, figure 1 reports wide variation across the
countries, both in the level and the evolution of business expenditure on R&D. Policy in-
struments included in POLICYit are real per capita government intramural expenditure on
R&D (GOV ERDit) and real per capita expenditure on R&D in the higher education sector
(HERDit). As a measure for direct R&D subsidies (SUBSit) we include real per capita
government funded expenditure on R&D performed in the business sector. A final mea-
sure included in POLICYit is the B-index (BINDEXit), which captures direct R&D tax
incentives3. In our empirical analysis, V Ait, BERDit and all variables in POLICYit will be
expressed in logarithms.
Regarding the variables in Zit, we focus on three possible determinants of business sector
R&D, i.e. the degree of openness of the economy (OPENit), the available stock of human
capital (HCAPit) in a country and the degree of product market regulation (PMRit). The
degree of openness is included to account for international trade, which is an important
channel of knowledge and technology transfers across countries raising the return to domestic
private R&D investment (e.g. Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe, Helpman, and Ho↵maister, 2009;
Acharya and Keller, 2009). Based on this argument, we expect a positive e↵ect from a higher
degree of openness on BERD. The stock of human capital is considered due to its potential
double impact on private R&D investment. First, human capital is an important factor
reflecting the absorptive capacity of an economy with regards to international technology
and knowledge (see amongst others Nelson, Denison, Sato, and Phelps, 1966; Coe, Helpman,
and Ho↵maister, 2009). Second, Acemoglu (1998) shows that a high proportion of skilled
workers in the economy stimulates high-skill biased technological change. As to product
market regulation, it would be our basic position to expect a U-shaped relationship with
R&D investment, in line with the arguments raised by Aghion, Bloom, Gri th, and Howitt
(2005) that we discussed in section 2.2. We measure OPENit as the sum of imports and
exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP. As a proxy for the stock of human
capital, we use the percentage of population, aged 15 and over that has completed tertiary
schooling. To capture PMRit, the OECD economy-wide product market regulation index is
2These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK and US. The selection of countries has been driven by data availability.
3See Section 2.1 for more details.
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employed.
As a final determinant of business funded and performed R&D, we introduce an indicator
for wage pressure. Its construction is discussed in Section 3.1.2.
3.1.2 An appropriate wage indicator
To assess the impact of wage formation and wage pressure on private R&D investment, we
follow Blanchard (2006) and use insights from growth theory. The approach is to compare
actual (growth of) real wage costs with the so-called ’warranted’ real wage (growth). The
latter is determined by the rate of Harrod-neutral technical progress. In growth theory, this
is the rate of real wage growth consistent with stable employment along a balanced growth
path. Blanchard (2006) constructs the rate of Harrod-neutral technical progress using the
Solow residual, and dividing it by the labour share. More formally, let Wit represent real
hourly labour cost in country i at time t and let Ait be a measure of labour e ciency driven
by technological progress. The underlying CRS production function is
Yit = K
↵
itG
 
it(AitLit)
(1 ↵  ), (2)
with Yit real output, Kit the stock of real private physical capital, Git the stock of real public
capital, Lit total hours worked, and AitLit e↵ective labour in hours. Labour e ciency can
then be computed as:
lnAit =
1
1  ↵    [lnYit   ↵ lnKit     lnGit   (1  ↵   ) lnLit] (3)
Following Blanchard’s reasoning, a suitable wage gap or wage pressure indicator will then be
defined as real hourly labour cost per e ciency unit of labour, WitAit . In our empirical analysis,
we will express this indicator in logs, such that we get
lnWAGEit = ln
Wit
Ait
= lnWit   lnAit (4)
As to data, Wit represents real compensation of employees per hour. To compute lnAit,
we estimate the production function in (2) for the same panel of countries that we study in our
empirical analysis of private R&D investment. In line with, amongst others, Costantini and
Destefanis (2009), Eberhardt and Teal (2013) and Everaert, Heylen, and Schoonackers (2015),
we account for the presence of unobserved common factors that are potentially non-stationary.
Estimation of this production function is similar to Everaert, Heylen, and Schoonackers (2015)
and results in a share of private capital in total income (↵) of 0.20, a share of public capital
( ) of 0.14, and a labour share (1   ↵    ) of 0.66. Our estimate for   is very close to the
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results reported by Bom and Ligthart (2014). Building on a meta-regression analysis, they
put forward 0.11 as long-run output elasticity of public capital. Using the Blanchard indicator
has the additional advantage that it is not (directly) a↵ected by endogenous adjustment of
labour productivity, as is the case for more traditional indicators that measure the wage gap
by relating real labour cost to labour productivity i.e. output per hour or per worker. Such
indicators will give the wrong sign when firms adjust capital intensity in response to wage
changes. For example, excessive wage increases may induce firms to substitute capital for
labour. The productivity of labour will then rise and excessive wage pressure may no longer
show up in the data, implying measurement error.
Figure 2 shows our indicator for wage pressure (lnWAGEit) in three groups of countries:
six euro area countries, four Nordic countries and four Anglo-Saxon countries. Note that
for each country, we normalized the wage gap to zero in 1974. Although this is obviously
somewhat arbitrary, the idea is that in the early 1970s about all countries were close to full
employment, so that wages must have been more or less at their ’warranted’ level4. All in all,
our indicator is very similar to the real wage gap of Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007), which is
also based on the Blanchard approach.
Wage pressure increased strongly in most countries throughout the second half of the
1970s, with a peak around 1982. From then onwards, the trend in the wage gap was negative
in most countries for at least one decade. Many countries such as Belgium, Italy and Swe-
den, institutionalized mechanisms of wage restraint or wage control to keep the evolution of
wages more in line with its warranted level. Other countries, like the UK, decentralised wage
bargaining, and introduced tough legislation to reduce union power. The main exceptions to
this overall pattern are the US, the Netherlands, Canada and Spain. The evolution of wages
was exceptional in the US in that we see no excess wage growth in the 1970s. Moreover,
since 1980, wage growth in the US has only been slightly smaller than its warranted level,
keeping the wage gap between 0 and -8 % all of the time. The Netherlands, by contrast, shows
a steady decline of wage pressure throughout almost the entire period under consideration.
This confirms the strong focus on wage moderation as an important policy instrument in
this country. Very influential in this respect was the so-called Wassenaar agreement of 1982,
which initiated a series of national social compacts to restrain wage growth. Unions were
convinced of the need to restrain inflationary pressure in the labour market and co-ordinated
action was introduced to bring this about. Canada and Spain di↵er in the sense that we see
no wage moderation in these countries during the last three decades. As a final observation,
almost all countries show a sharp rise in wage pressure between 2008 and 2010.
4Even if this assumption were wrong for some countries, it will not a↵ect our estimation results in Section
4, since we control for unobserved country fixed e↵ects. What matters is the evolution of lnWAGE over time,
not its initial level.
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Figure 2: Indicator of wage pressure (lnWAGEit) for three groups of countries
(a) Euro area countries (b) Nordic countries
(c) Anglo-Saxon countries
In our regressions in Section 4 we will at first introduce lnWAGE as a separate variable.
Building on our discussion in Section 2.2, however, we will soon add interaction terms with
context variables that may tilt the e↵ect of wage pressure on R&D investment. The degree of
openness (OPEN) and the degree of product market regulation (PMR), already discussed
in Section 3.1.1, a↵ect the strength of the competition that firms experience. Another is the
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degree of employment protection legislation (EPL), The higher EPL, the more di cult it
may be for firms to adapt by changing (expensive) labour. Both OPEN , EPL and PMR
may thus a↵ect the profit di↵erential when firms do not innovate (and wage pressure rises).
These considerations would suggest significant e↵ects from these interaction terms on R&D
investment.
3.1.3 Properties of the data
As a guide to selecting the most appropriate estimation method in Section 3.3 below and
to determine the optimal functional form for equation (1), we first look at two important
properties of the data: the degree of cross-sectional dependence and the order of integration.
Cross-sectional dependence
Recently, the panel data literature has seen an increasing interest in models with unobserved,
time-varying heterogeneity that may stem from omitted (and unobserved) common variables
or global shocks that a↵ect all units, but perhaps to a di↵erent degree (see e.g. Coakley,
Fuertes, and Smith, 2002; Eberhardt and Teal, 2011; Everaert and Pozzi, 2014). These omit-
ted common variables induce error cross-sectional dependence and may lead to inconsistent
estimates if they are correlated with the explanatory variables and to a spurious regression
problem if they are non-stationary.
At the macroeconomic level, cross-sectional dependencies are rather the rule than the ex-
ception because countries are interconnected through trade, geography, international relations
etc. (Westerlund, 2008). When considering the potential determinants of business financed
and performed R&D intensity across OECD countries, unobserved common variables are also
likely to be present. A first potential common factor is a global business cycle, which results
from the increased business cycle synchronization across countries. Changes in this global
business cycle a↵ect the financial constraints of both the government and the business sector
and will thus have an impact on business R&D intensity (Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe,
2003). Second, and probably more important is the role of the unobserved available world
level of technology which causes international technology and knowledge spillovers. These
could be regarded as omitted unobserved factors for explaining business R&D expenditures.
The reason being that technology spillovers a↵ect private R&D investment as they have a pos-
itive impact on a country’s absorptive capacity and a↵ect private returns to R&D investment
(Eberhardt, Helmers, and Strauss, 2013).
If these unobserved common factors have indeed an impact on private sector R&D, this
should show up as strong cross-sectional dependence in the data. Table 1 therefore reports
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the average pairwise correlation coe cient (⇢ˆ) and the cross-sectional dependence (CD) test
of Pesaran (2004). As all series are potentially non-stationary, we also report results for the
first-di↵erenced data to avoid spurious nonzero correlation. To assess if common factors are
really influencing private sector funded and performed R&D, especially the cross-sectional
dependence in lnBERDit is important. For completeness, we also report the test results for
each of the explanatory variables.
The results in Table 1 show that all, but one, variables exhibit considerable positive cross-
sectional correlation in levels and in first di↵erences. lnSUBSit is the exception as the null
hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence is not rejected for the variable in levels, but is
rejected for the data in first di↵erences. The finding of significant cross-sectional dependence
in lnBERDit implies that we need to take this into account when choosing our econometric
methodology and estimating our empirical model.
Table 1: Cross-sectional dependence in the data
Sample period: 1981-2012, 14 OECD countries
Levels First-di↵erences Levels First-di↵erences
b⇢ CD b⇢ CD b⇢ CD b⇢ CD
lnBERDit 0.881 47.55 [0.00] 0.194 10.277 [0.00] lnBINDEXit 0.190 10.255 [0.00] 0.037 1.965 [0.05]
lnV Ait 0.926 49.955 [0.00] 0.575 30.544 [0.00] OPENit 0.701 37.830 [0.00] 0.669 35.507 [0.00]
lnGOV ERDit 0.051 2.745 [0.01] 0.054 2.87 [0.01] HCAPit 0.930 50.185 [0.00] 0.05 2.656 [0.01]
lnHERDit 0.961 51.868 [0.00] 0.089 4.771 [0.00] lnWAGEit 0.415 2.379 [0.00] 0.447 23.745 [0.00]
lnSUBSit 0.027 1.468 [0.14] 0.043 2.262 [0.02] PMRit 0.958 51.738 [0.00] 0.191 10.147 [0.00]
Notes: The average cross-correlation coe cient b⇢ = (2 /N (N   1))PN 1i=1 PNj=i+1 b⇢ij is the average of the country-by-country
cross-correlation coe cients b⇢ij (for i 6= j). CD is the Pesaran (2004) test defined as p2T /N (N   1)PN 1i=1 PNj=i+1 b⇢ij ,
which is asymptotically standard normal under the null of cross-sectional independence. p-values are reported in square
brackets.
Time series properties
We also analyse the time series properties of each of the variables used. This requires a panel
unit root test allowing for cross-sectional dependence. Such panel unit root tests have been
proposed by, most notably, Pesaran (2007), Moon and Perron (2004) and Bai and Ng (2004).
These tests are similar in that they all assume an observed variable xit to have the following
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common factor structure
xit = dit + ft⇡i + ⇠it, (5)
where ft is an r⇥ 1 vector of r common factors with country-specific factor loadings ⇡i, ⇠it is
an idiosyncratic error term and dit is a deterministic component which can be (i) zero, dit = 0,
(ii) an idiosyncratic intercept, dit = d0i, or (iii) an idiosyncratic intercept and idiosyncratic
linear trend dit = d0i + d1it. Cross-sectional dependence stems from the component ft⇡i
which is correlated over countries as it includes the common factors ft. The series xit is non-
stationary if at least one of the common factors in ft is non-stationary, or the idiosyncratic
error ⇠it is non-stationary, or both. The above mentioned panel unit root tests di↵er in the
allowed number and order of integration of the unobserved common factors and in the way
these factors are eliminated.
The most general panel unit root test allowing for cross-sectional dependence is the PANIC
unit root test of Bai and Ng (2004) as this is the only one that allows for non-stationarity in
either the common factors, or in the idiosyncratic errors or in both. Rather than testing the
order of integration using the observed data, xit is first decomposed according to the structure
in equation (5). By applying the method of principal components to the first-di↵erenced data,
the common and idiosyncratic components in first-di↵erences can be estimated consistently,
irrespectively of their orders of integration. Next, these components are accumulated to obtain
the corresponding level estimates bfpct and b⇠pcit . These components can then be tested separately
for unit roots. When there is only one factor, testing for a unit root in bfpct can be done using
a standard augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)-type test (with deterministic terms according to
the specification of dit). For multiple common factors, the MQ
c,⌧
c and MQ
c,⌧
f statistics (see
Bai and Ng, 2004, for details) are designed to determine the number of independent stochastic
trends r1  r in bfpct . As under the appropriate choice for the number of common factors,b⇠pcit by design satisfies the cross-sectional independence assumption required for pooling, the
Maddala and Wu (1999) (MW) panel unit root test can be used on b⇠pcit . This consists of
combining p-values for the ADF tests (with no deterministic terms) on the idiosyncratic errorb⇠pcit . The relevant distributions for the ADF tests on bfpct and b⇠pcit , for the intercept only and
the linear trend model, can be found in Bai and Ng (2004).
Monte Carlo simulation results in Bai and Ng (2004), for samples as small as (T=100,
N=40), and in Gutierrez (2006), for samples as small as (T=50, N=20), show that the
PANIC approach performs well in small samples. The ADF test on the common factor and
the MW test on the idiosyncratic error terms both have an actual size close to the 5% nominal
level and adequate power. Applications of the PANIC approach to unit root testing using a
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similar data span as ours (T=32, N=14) can be found in, among others, Byrne, Fiess, and
Ronald (2011), Costantini, Demetriades, James, and Lee (2013) and Everaert, Heylen, and
Schoonackers (2015).
Table 2: PANIC unit root tests
Sample period: 1981-2012, 14 OECD countries
bfpct b⇠pcit bfpct b⇠pcit
Det r r1 MW-test Det r r1 MW-test
lnBERDit dit 1 1 37.907 [0.10] lnBINDEX0i dit 0 0 17.45 [0.93]
lnV Ait dit 3 3 24.854 [0.64] OPENit dit 2 2 12.364 [1.00]
lnGOV ERDit d0i 1 1 12.056 [1.00] HCAPit dit 5 5 42.238 [0.04]
lnHERDit dit 0 0 27.91 [0.47] lnWAGEit d0i 3 3 21.597 [0.80]
lnSUBSit dit 1 1 27.868 [0.47] PMRit dit 3 3 24.572 [0.65]
Notes: ‘Det’ indicates the deterministic component of the model, i.e. d0i for the intercept only model and dit = d0i+d1it
for the linear trend model. The number of common factors is estimated using the BIC3 of Bai and Ng (2002) with a
maximum of 5 factors. When r = 1, the number of non-stationary factors r1 is determined using the ADF-GLS test of
Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) with deterministic terms according to the specification of dit. When r > 1, r1 is
determined using theMQcc (intercept only model) orMQ
⌧
c (linear trend model) statistic of Bai and Ng (2004). The panel
unit root test on the estimated idiosyncratic errors is the Maddala and Wu (1999) (MW) test (with no deterministic
terms). The null hypothesis for each of these tests is that the series has a unit root. p-values are reported in square
brackets.
In Table 2 we report the results of the PANIC unit root tests. For each of the variables
the number of common factors r is estimated using the BIC3 information criterion suggested
by Bai and Ng (2002). We prefer the BIC3 information criterion as based on the simulation
results of Bai and Ng (2002) and Moon and Perron (2007), the BIC3 outperforms other infor-
mation criteria in small samples like ours. The specification of the deterministic component
dit is chosen from the observed trending behaviour of the variables. Results show that all
variables are found to be non-stationary at the 5 % level of significance. For all but two
variables, the non-stationarity is induced by both the common component and idisoyncratic
errors. For the variable HCAPit non-stationarity only stems from the presence of a set of
unobserved common factors while for lnHERDit non-stationarity comes from the idiosyn-
cratic component as this variable is found to have no common factor according to the BIC3
information criterion. When focusing on the main variable of interest, lnBERDit, the Bai
and Ng (2002) test to determine the number of common factors shows the presence of 1
non-stationary common factor.
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3.2 Empirical model
When choosing the optimal functional form for (1), Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003)
and Falk (2006) estimate a log linear partial adjustment model by arguing that firms do not
change their R&D spending immediately following changes in direct or indirect public support
for R&D or changes in the other determinants. However, both Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe
(2003) and Falk (2006) did not take into account two important properties of the data, i.e. the
significant degree of cross-sectional dependence due to the presence of unobserved common
factors and the non-stationarity of the variables considered. In this empirical analysis we
explicitly deal with these properties and consider as our basic specification the following
long-run relationship for lnBERDit,
lnBERDit =  i +Xit  + µit. (6)
where Xit = (lnV Ait, lnPOLICYit, Zit, lnWAGEit) and  0 = ( 1, 2, 3, 4). In this
equation, the individual e↵ect  i captures unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity.
To deal with cross-sectional correlated errors (see Section 3.1.3) we adopt a multi-factor er-
ror structure, where cross-sectional dependence is modelled to arise from unobserved common
factors (see e.g. Eberhardt and Teal, 2011; Everaert, Heylen, and Schoonackers, 2015):
µit =  
0
ift + ✏it, (7)
where ft is an rx1 vector of unobserved common factors and  i an rx1 country-specific vector
of factor loadings. The generality of the error structure in (7) is an advantage as it allows
for an unknown (but fixed) number of unobserved common components with heterogeneous
factor loadings (heterogeneous cross-sectional dependence). It thus also nests common time
e↵ects (homogeneous cross-sectional dependence) as a special case and controls for possible
spatial spillovers (Pesaran and Tosetti, 2011). This last element could be important as in a
recent paper Montmartin and Herrera (2015) point to the importance of spatial dependence
between private R&D activities in OECD countries.
In the empirical analysis we will focus on determining the long-run drivers of business
sector R&D by estimating equation (6). Note that when estimating this equation it is impor-
tant to deal appropriately with the multi-factor error structure in (7) as ignoring the presence
of unobserved common factors leads to inconsistent estimates if the unobserved factors are
correlated with the explanatory variables and to a spurious regression problem if they are non-
stationary. Finally, as all variables have a unit root we test for the existence of a cointegration
relationship between the variables in (6).
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3.3 Econometric methodology
In line with Pesaran (2006) and Kapetanios, Pesaran, and Yamagata (2011), the set of unob-
served common factors ft is identified from the cross-sectional dimension of the data. Taking
cross-sectional averages of the model represented by equations (6)-(7) yields
yt =   +  ft +Xt  + ✏t, (8)
where yit = lnBERDit and where yt =
1
N
PN
i=1 yit and similarly for  ,  , Xt and ✏t. For
notational convenience we assume a single common factor (r = 1) but the results straightfor-
wardly generalize to multiple factors (see Pesaran, 2006). Equation (8) can then be solved
for ft as
ft =
1
 
 
yt      Xt    ✏t
 
, (9)
which yields bf cat
bf cat = 1
 
 
yt      Xt 
 
, (10)
as a proxy for ft. Under the assumption that ✏it is a zero mean stationary error term which is
uncorrelated over cross-section units, implying that plim
N!1
✏t = 0 for each t, we have that bf cat p !
ft for N !1. This is the main result in Pesaran (2006) that the cross-sectional averages of
the observed data can be used as observable proxies for ft. Although the construction of bf cat
as a consistent estimator for ft in equation (10) requires knowledge of the unknown underlying
parameters, Pesaran (2006) shows that these parameters can be estimated from an augmented
model obtained by replacing the unobserved ft in equation (7) by the cross-sectional averages
of the observed data using equation (9)
yit =  i +
 
yt      Xt    ✏t
   i
 
+Xit  + "it, (11)
=  +i + yt i1 +Xt i2 +Xit  + ✏
+
it , (12)
where  +i =  i     i
 
  ,  i1 =  i
 
  ,  i2 =  i
 
    and ✏+it = ✏it    i
 
  ✏t. Since ✏
+
it
p ! ✏it
for N ! 1, the augmented model in equation (12) - ignoring any parameter restrictions -
can be estimated with least squares (LS), an approach referred to as the CCEP estimator.5
Pesaran (2006) shows that, under appropriate regularity conditions, the CCEP estimator is
consistent and asymptotically normal in stationary panel regressions. Kapetanios, Pesaran,
5Although equation (12) is derived, for notational convenience, under the assumption of a single factor,
exactly the same augmented form is obtained for multiple common factors (see Pesaran, 2006).
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and Yamagata (2011) show that these asymptotic results continu to hold in non-stationary
panels provided that the idiosyncratic error term ✏it is stationary. This implies that there is
cointegration (i) between (yit, Xit) if ft ⇠ I(0) or (ii) between (yit, Xit, ft) if ft ⇠ I(1).
As our empirical analysis involves testing for cointegration, we need an appropriate panel
cointegration test based on the CCEP estimator. These kind of tests have been suggested
by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2011) and Everaert (2014). Banerjee and Carrion-i-
Silvestre (2011) show that under the null of no cointegration, the linear CCEP estimator allows
for consistent estimation of the homogeneous coe cients   but not for the heterogeneous
coe cients ( i, i). Given this result, they suggest to obtain a consistent estimate for the
composite error term eit =  i +  ift + ✏it as
beit = yit  Xitb  = \( i +  ift + ✏it), (13)
and test for cointegration using a panel unit root test on beit that takes into account the
cross-sectional dependence induced by the set of unobserved common factors ft. To this
end, they suggest to use the cross-section augmented ADF (CADF) panel unit root test of
Pesaran (2007). Although this approach can e↵ectively sweep out a single common factor, ft
is restricted to have the same order of integration as the idiosyncratic error term ✏it. This rules
out that ft ⇠ I(1) and ✏it ⇠ I(0), i.e. cointegration between (yit, xit, ft). Since the structure
of the composite error term eit =  i +  ift + ✏it aligns with the general factor structure of
equation (5), an obvious alternative to the CADF test is to apply the PANIC approach of Bai
and Ng (2004).6 This allows to consistently decompose beit in a set of common factors, denotedbfpct , and an idiosyncratic error term, labeled b✏pcit , which can then be separately tested for unit
roots (see PANIC approach outlined in Section 3.1.3). The main advantage of this approach
is that the test whether the idiosyncratic errors ✏it are stationary or not does not depend on
the order of integration of ft. As such, testing for cointegration from the CCEP estimation
results boils down to testing whether there is a unit root in b✏pcit , for which the MW panel unit
root test can be used. Note that although cointegration only requires the idiosyncratic errors
to be I(0), the integration properties of the common factors provide additional interesting
information, i.e. when ft ⇠ I(0) there is cointegration between (yit, Xit) while for ft ⇠ I(1)
there is cointegration between (yit, Xit, ft). In a simulation exercise both Everaert (2014) and
Everaert, Heylen, and Schoonackers (2015) show that a PANIC on the composite error term
6Using the PANIC approach to testing for panel cointegration in the presence of common factors has also
been suggested by Gengenbach, Palm, and Urbain (2006), Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) and Bai and
Carrion-i-Silvestre (2013). The main di↵erence between these approaches and ours lies in the estimation of
the unknown coe cients in the cointegrating relation, for which we use the CCEP estimator while the above
references estimate a model in first-di↵erences with the common factors and factor loadings estimated using
principal components.
23
beit is an appropriate approach to test for common-factor augmented panel cointegration, even
in small samples as ours.
4 Estimation results
4.1 Main results
The main estimation results are reported in Table 4. As mentioned before, our dependent
variable is the log of real per capita R&D investment financed and performed by the busi-
ness sector (lnBERDit). We estimate 10 di↵erent specifications. We start in column (1)
by considering the standard set of variables that Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) in-
troduce in their regressions. Next to value added in the business sector (lnV Ait), there are
four policy variables: public funding of R&D projects in the business sector (lnSUBSit),
the B-index reflecting a country’s tax treatment of R&D investment (lnBINDEXit), direct
’intramural’ government expenditures on R&D (lnGOV ERDit) and expenditures on R&D
by higher education institutions (lnHERDit). In columns (2)-(4) we respectively extend the
set of explanatory variables by the degree of openness (OPENit), the stock of human capital
(HCAPit), and by our wage pressure indicator (lnWAGEit). Columns (5) further controls
for a non-linear impact of the amount of public subsidies whereas columns (6)-(10) test for
non-linear and/or heterogeneous e↵ects of wage pressure.
In a first step each specification is tested for the existence of a cointegration relationship
using the PANIC approach of Bai and Ng (2004), which requires determining the number of
unobserved common factors in lnBERDit. The analysis in Table 2 points to the existence of
1 common factor in lnBERDit. As an additional check, Table 3 reports the cross-sectional
correlation in lnBERDit and in the CCEP composite error term beit after taking out the con-
tribution of r = (0, 1, 2, 3) common factors. For r = 0, this is the cross-sectional correlation
in the original series, while for r > 0 this is the cross-sectional correlation in the idiosyncratic
part calculated using PANIC with r = (1, 2, 3). The results confirm the presence of one com-
mon factor as this seems su cient to remove the cross-sectional dependence from lnBERDit
and the CCEP composite error term.
FE results
To highlight the importance of dealing with cross-sectional dependence for the estimation
results, we first ignore any unobserved common factors and estimate the empirical model
using a standard FE estimator. The results can be found in Appendix A. Using the FE
estimator, we cannot reject the null of no cointegration for all di↵erent specifications. The
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Table 3: Determining the number of relevant common factors
Sample period: 1981-2012, 14 OECD countries
Cross-sectional correlation left after taking out r factors
r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3
lnBERDit 0.881 -0.053 -0.063 -0.055   lnBERDit 0.1935 -0.048 -0.06 -0.059beSit1 0.549 -0.015 -0.017 -0.0384  beSit1 0.086 -0.02 -0.013 -0.041beSit2 0.487 -0.028 -0.041 -0.024  beSit2 0.096 -0.032 -0.034 -0.039beSit3 0.194 -0.044 -0.044 -0.063  beSit3 0.112 -0.038 -0.032 -0.056beSit4 0.574 -0.026 -0.040 -0.043  beSit4 0.092 -0.025 -0.028 -0.039beSit5 0.131 -0.058 -0.062 -0.066  beSit5 0.147 -0.045 -0.048 -0.058beSit6 0.086 -0.047 -0.039 -0.056  beSit6 0.128 -0.047 -0.038 -0.049beSit7 0.089 -0.042 -0.044 -0.052  beSit7 0.116 -0.039 -0.04 -0.054beSit8 0.127 -0.052 -0.063 -0.053  beSit8 0.154 -0.047 -0.055 -0.06beSit9 0.817 -0.047 -0.047 -0.052  beSit9 0.117 -0.040 -0.036 -0.054beSit10 0.315 -0.051 -0.043 -0.054  beSit10 0.103 -0.038 -0.027 -0.049
Note: beSit1, beSit2,..., beSit8 are the CCEP composite error terms, defined in equation (13) taken from specification
(1),(2),...,(8) respectively. We report the average cross-correlation b⇢ (see Table 1 for the definition) after taking our
r common factors using PANIC.
PANIC cointegration test at the bottom of Table 7 shows that both the common factor
and the idiosyncratic error terms are non-stationary at the 5% level of significance. This is
problematic as Urbain and Westerlund (2011) show that the standard result in Phillips and
Moon (1999) that panel regressions yield consistent results even if there is no cointegration,
does no longer hold when the non-stationarity in the error term is induced by a common
factor. This implies that the results from the FE estimator, which ignores the presence of
non-stationary common factors, are spurious. As such we do not interpret these results.
CCEP results
Turning to the CCEP estimator, which controls for unobserved common factors, the cointe-
gration test results in Table 4 show that for all, but one, specifications containing our wage
measure the null of no cointegration can be rejected at low levels of significance. For speci-
fications (6) and (7), we can reject the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level while for
specifications (4), (8) and (10) the null can be rejected at the 5% level. For specifications (5)
and (9), the null can only be rejected at the 10 % level of significance. The importance of
taking into account wage policy as a factor influencing private R&D investment is confirmed
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by considering the cointegration test results of specifications (1), (2) and (3). For these
specficiations, the null of no cointegration cannot be rejected at the 5% level of significance,
implying that our wage measure is an essential part of the cointegration relationship. Looking
in detail at the PANIC cointegration test results, the time series properties of the unobserved
common factor, ft reveal that this variable is part of the cointegration relationship. So there
is cointegration between (yit, Xit, ft).
Regarding the estimated coe cients, the e↵ect of total value added on R&D investment
in the business sector is robustly positive and statistically significant in all our regressions.
The estimated (partial) long-run elasticity varies between 0.43 and 0.75, the median being
0.65. As to public policies, our estimation results reveal various ways in which governments
can e↵ectively promote R&D investment in a country. One approach is to give tax incentives
or subsidies and grants. Another is to spend more on R&D within the public sector itself if
this does not crowd out private spending. Our evidence suggests that both options can work,
if chosen appropriately.
Let us start with the former. In a majority of our regressions, we observe a negative and
statistically significant e↵ect on the B-index of about -0.18, supporting the hypothesis that tax
incentives encourage private R&D investment. This result is clearly in line with most of the
literature that we summarized in Section 2.1. In some of our regressions, though, the observed
negative e↵ect is not statistically significant. For public funding of investment in the business
sector (lnSUBSit) we always obtain positive but mostly highly insignificant elasticities. Only
in specifications (9) and (10) the long-run elasticity varies around 0.4 and is significant at
the 5% level. At first sight, our results therefore seems to indicate that private firms are not
encouraged to raise their own R&D expenditures and undertake additional investments when
some of their projects are publicly funded. Neither, however, do they cut back on their own
spending. The observed positive coe cient on lnSUBSit clearly challenges the hypothesis
that subsidized private firms would just substitute public money for their own. Additional
analysis, however, as in specification (5), reveals a much richer reality behind this general
result. When we follow Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) and allow for di↵erent e↵ects
from public funding on private R&D expenditures depending on the level of the subsidization
percentage, we find both at low subsidization rates (i.e. below 4%) and at high subsidization
rates (above 11%) a negative elasticity of public funding7. At intermediate subsidization rates,
however, we find this elasticity to be positive (0.076) and statistically significant. We conclude
that direct government funding can be e↵ective in promoting private R&D investment, but
7We follow Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) and use the share of government funded R&D in total
business performed R&D as a proxy for the subsidization rate. We find this rate to be low (< 4 % on average
over the sample period) in Australia and Finland, and high (> 11%) in France, Italy, Norway, Spain, UK and
US. The other countries take intermediate positions.
26
this funding should not be too low, neither too high. In the former case support may be too
weak to help firms overcome the risks and uncertainties involved in innovation projects. In the
latter case, support may be larger than the number of (new) projects that firms can develop,
so that in the end they simply use public resources to finance projects that would have been
done anyway. In this sense we confirm earlier evidence by Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe
(2003).
Results on the e↵ects of R&D spending within the government sector (lnGOV ERDit) and
within institutions of higher education (lnHERDit) all go in the same direction. The e↵ect
is positive in almost all cases but small and mostly insignificant. Although this may sound
poor from a statistical perspective, it is not unimportant economically. It means that each
euro that the government spends on ’intramural’ R&D or on R&D within universities adds
one euro to aggregate spending on R&D. Our findings therefore go against the hypothesis
of (weak) crowding out, for which Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) found evidence,
as well as against the hypothesis of complementarity between public and private spending,
as suggested by Falk (2006). Only for lnGOV ERDit in columns (6) and (7) we may find
some weak indications in favour of complementarity. The regressions in these columns yield
a long-run positive elasticity of about 0.18.
Important is also that governments can stimulate private R&D investment by encouraging
human capital formation. This is confirmed by our empirical results which yield very robust
and significant positive estimates on the stock of high skilled human capital (HCAPit). Con-
sidering the lack of consistent findings in the existing literature (see for example Falk, 2006),
this is an interesting result. We also find a positive e↵ect from the degree of openness of
the economy on business R&D spending. In column (2) this positive e↵ect is not statisti-
cally significant. In specification (6) it is. This may point to the importance of international
transfer of technology and knowledge for business R&D. However, in line with results that
we discuss below for the wage gap, a complementary interpretation could be that a more
open economy raises the degree of competition that firms face. Facing more competitors then
seems to encourage firms to innovate.
An important potential determinant of business-funded and performed R&D is wage pres-
sure. Theory being inconclusive, what do we learn from our results on its impact on inno-
vation? When analyzing the basic e↵ect in specifications (4) and (5) we do not find any
8The observed elasticities allow us to compute the marginal e↵ect on business financed R&D and on
aggregate R&D spending (business + public) induced by one euro spent by the government. Considering that
BERDit relates to GOV ERDit as 5 to 1 and to SUBSit as 13 to 1 on average over all countries considered
in our analysis, elasticities of 0.126 for GOV ERDit and 0.076 for SUBSit (the highest we observe in our
results) would imply that  BERDit GOV ERDit = 0.63 and
 BERDit
 SUBSit
=0.99. In the case of GOV ERDit, aggregate
R&D spending would thus rise by 1.63 (1 euro public + 0.63 euro private) euro, in the case of SUBSit by 1.99
(1 euro public + 0.99 euro private) euro.
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significant e↵ect from wage formation on R&D investment. In column (4) the e↵ect is in-
significantly negative whereas in column (5) it is insignificantly positive. However, a much
more detailed analysis, based on the theoretical arguments in Section 2.2, gives a clearer
view. As wage pressure has possibly positive e↵ects in a very competitive environment, we
allow in specification (6) for interaction between lnWAGEit and OPENit. The basic impact
of lnWAGEit is now negative and highly significant, with an estimated long-run coe cient
equal to -1.1. If wage pressure increases with 1 %point, this implies that, on average, private
R&D investment drops with 1.11 %. Higher wage pressure thus seems to undermine busi-
ness R&D expenditures. An obvious explanation, and in line with Ulph and Ulph (1994),
would be that higher wages reduce the profit di↵erential between innovating and not inno-
vating. However, the basic hypothesis only seems to survive in economies where firms face
relatively little (foreign) competition. In a competitive environment the wage e↵ect may be
tilted. From the interaction term in specification (6) we learn that in countries with a degree
of openess higher than 80 % the global impact of wage pressure becomes positive, meaning
that higher wages encourage private R&D investment. Specification (7) di↵erentiates the
e↵ect of lnWAGEit according to the level of employment protection legislation (EPLit)9. In
countries with low average EPL a significant negative e↵ect of wage pressure emerges, again
indicating that higher wages reduces the incentive to innovate. In (very) regulated labour
markets the negative impact disappears as for the other two groups of countries we observe
(insignificant) positive e↵ects of wage pressure on business R&D investment. As an addi-
tional check, the possible impact of openess and labour market characteristics are integrated
in specification (8). We distinguish three groups of countries. The first group of Anglo-Saxon
countries is characterized by a relatively low degree of openness and low employment pro-
tection legislation. The estimated e↵ect from lnWAGEit is clearly negative in this group
(although significant only at 20%). The second group of euro area countries is characterized
by rather the opposite of a high degree of openness and rigid labour markets. Here we observe
a significant positive coe cient on lnWAGEit. The arguments raised by Kleinknecht (1998)
and co-authors that an excessive focus on wage moderation could be harmful to innovation,
would thus seem to find support for this group. The third group of Nordic countries takes an
intermediate position.
9As time variation in EPLit is too limited, we cannot interact lnWAGEit with EPLit. As a solution, we
di↵erentiate the impact of lnWAGEit amongst three groups of countries with di↵erent average EPLit
Table 4: CCEP regression results
Dependent variable: lnBERDit
Sample period: 1981-2012, 14 OECD countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Coe cient estimates
Explanatory variables
lnV Ait 0.644⇤⇤⇤ 0.709⇤⇤⇤ 0.646⇤⇤⇤ 0.459⇤⇤ 0.663⇤⇤⇤ 0.659⇤⇤⇤ 0.497⇤⇤ 0.742⇤⇤⇤ 0.428⇤ 0.512⇤⇤
(0.18) (0.194) (0.187) (0.242) (0.227) (0.257) (0.249) (0.222) (0.230) (0.240)
lnBINDEXit  0.186⇤⇤ -0.114  0.187⇤⇤  0.182⇤⇤  0.170⇤⇤ -0.103 -0.10  0.189⇤⇤  0.229⇤⇤⇤  0.142⇤
(0.087) (0.10) (0.089) (0.086) (0.084) (0.093) (0.092) (0.080) (0.086) (0.082)
lnSUBSit 0.004 0.01 0.017 0.000 0.028 0.031 0.034 0.046⇤⇤ 0.044⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
lnGOV ERDit 0.055 0.053 0.055 0.064 0.059 0.087⇤ 0.126⇤⇤ 0.021 0.023 0.020
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.046) (0.05) (0.042) (0.053) (0.049)
lnHERDit 0.071 0.063 -0.017 0.096 -0.057 0.042 0.032 0.074 -0.018 0.022
(0.069) (0.072) (0.071) (0.068) (0.064) (0.071) (0.071) (0.066) (0.065) (0.067)
HCAPit 0.051⇤⇤⇤ 0.093⇤⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤⇤ 0.068⇤⇤⇤ 0.092⇤⇤⇤ 0.047⇤⇤⇤ 0.067⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.01) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
OPENit 0.002 0.014⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.005)
lnWAGEit -0.205 0.127  1.108⇤⇤ -0.085 0.383
(0.211) (0.197) (0.463) (0.202) (0.445)
PMRit 0.419⇤⇤ -0.112
(0.196) (0.154)
PMR2it -0.046
(0.036)
lnSUBSit ⇤ low -0.053
(0.075)
lnSUBSit ⇤medium 0.076⇤⇤
(0.034)
lnSUBSit ⇤ high  0.087⇤⇤
(0.040)
lnWAGEit ⇤OPENit 0.014⇤⇤
(0.006)
lnWAGEit ⇤ PMRit  0.295⇤
(0.172)
lnWAGEit ⇤ epllow  1.205⇤⇤⇤
(0.447)
lnWAGEit ⇤ eplmiddle 0.134
(0.474)
lnWAGEit ⇤ eplhigh 0.092
(0.257)
lnWAGEit ⇤ anglo -0.639
(0.464)
lnWAGEit ⇤ euro 1.331⇤⇤⇤
(0.338)
lnWAGEit ⇤ nordic 0.27
(0.305)
Panic Cointegration test (one common factor)
ADF-GLS on bfpct -0.699 -1.392 -0.931 -0.797 -1.455 -2.105 -1.55 -2.168 -0.073 -0.344
[0.97] [0.84] [0.94] [0.96] [0.82] [0.52] [0.79] [0.49] [0.99] [0.99]
MW on b✏pcit 1.23 1.37⇤ 1.086 1.603⇤⇤ 1.295⇤ 2.446⇤⇤⇤ 2.918⇤⇤⇤ 1.661⇤⇤ 11.460⇤ 2.085⇤⇤
[0.11] [0.09] [0.14] [0.05] [0.10] [0.01] [0.00] [0.05] [0.07] [0.02]
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. ⇤, ⇤⇤ and ⇤⇤⇤ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. For the panel cointegration test
results, the unit root test on the common factor bFt is a ADF-GLS test for a model with constant. The corresponding (simulated) p-values are reported in
square brackets. The unit root test on the estimated idiosyncratic errors b✏pcit is a MW test. The corresponding p-values are reported in square brackets
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Finally, in specifications (9) and (10) we analyse the direct impact of product market
(de)regulation, PMRit, and its possible e↵ect on the relation between wage pressure and
innovation. Following Aghion, Bloom, Gri th, and Howitt (2005), a U-shaped relationship
should be expected between PMRit and lnBERDit. In specification (9) we do not find
evidence for this U-shaped e↵ect. On the contrary, results show that more regulated product
markets increase firms’ incentive to invest in R&D. In this view, higher product market
regulation, and thus lower competition, increases firms’ rents when investing in R&D. When
also taking into account the possible impact of PMRit on the e↵ect of wage pressure on
business funded and performed R&D, which is done in specification (10), the direct impact
of PMRit is somewhat di↵erent. Now, higher product market regulation has a negative,
but insignficant, impact on the amount of business R&D expenditures. More interestingly is
the interaction between PMRit and lnWAGEit. This interaction e↵ect confirms our earlier
finding. In a less competitive environment (high PMRit), higher wage pressure reduces the
incentives of firms to invest in R&D. When product markets become more deregulated, the
basic negative e↵ect disappears and in these circumstances wage pressure can even stimulate
private R&D investment.
4.2 The importance of economic and policy related variables in explaining
private investment in R&D
Our empirical results in Table 4 help us to understand and explain important di↵erences in
the level and evolution of real business funded and performed R&D in the OECD during the
last decades. In what follows, we discuss the explanatory power of our estimated empirical
model and conduct a counterfactual analysis. The latter allows us to assess the contribution
of changes since 1981 in public policy, wage pressure and human capital to the evolution of
business R&D. What fraction of the total change in BERD between 1981 and 2012 can these
explanatory variables explain? Which was more important, which was less important? Are
the results the same for all countries/country groups?
Explanatory power
Figure 3 demonstrates the capacity of our empirical model to explain the variation in business
R&D investment across countries and over time. We use the regression result in specification
(6). The upper panel in Figure 3 (panel a) relates our model’s prediction (economic explana-
tion) for the level of business R&D expenditures in 2006-2007 to the true observation10. Both
10We choose these years as they are the last before the outbreak of the global financial crisis. Severe shocks
to firms’ investment decisions during this crisis imply that the data are much less likely to match the long-run
equilibrium relationship that our model captures.
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prediction and true observation are represented as percentage deviations from their overall
country averages. The lower panel (panel b) relates predicted and observed changes in busi-
ness funded and performed R&D between 1981 and 2007. We emphasize that our predictions
in both panels have been obtained solely from using the ’economic’ and ’policy related’ parts
of the estimated equation. They do not include the country-specific fixed e↵ects nor the
approximations for the country-specific factor loadings and unobserved common factors.
Correlation in panel (a) is 0.50. Our model correctly predicts far above average business
R&D investment in 2006-2007 in the US and (far) below average R&D investment in Italy
and France. The model’s prediction of close to average performance in Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Denmark and Norway is also quite well in line with the facts. On the other hand,
using only the economic and policy related explanatory variables in the model, it is harder to
match the high level of business R&D investment in 2006-2007 in Finland and Sweden. So it
is to match relative low investment in Spain. It is clear that for these countries the unobserved
common factor was more important than for other countries. In this respect, our results are
in line with those of Everaert, Heylen, and Schoonackers (2015). Studying the drivers of
TFP, they find for Finland and Sweden a relatively strong and rising absorptive capacity to
the (unobserved and common) world level of technology. Stronger international technology
spillovers, and their e↵ects on the private return to R&D, may explain an important part of
the above average business investment in innovation in these countries. The opposite may
explain weaker investment in Spain. Clearly, the observation that the common factor plays
an important role, at least for some countries, is fully in line with our earlier finding that this
factor belongs to the cointegration relationship. It supports (again) our choice for the CCEP
estimator.
Correlation in panel (b) is 0.34. The model again seems to have the main drivers of
R&D investment right for the US, France and Italy. It also explains quite well the change in
business R&D investment over time in countries like Austria and Norway. Finland is again by
far the largest outlier. On the basis of (changes in) economic and policy related variables it
is impossible to explain the strong actual rise in BERD since 1981 in this country. Dropping
Finland, correlation in panel (b) rises to 0.50.
Counterfactual analysis
Figure 4 reveals the estimated size of the estimated e↵ects on business R&D expenditures
of changes in public innovation policy, wage pressure and human capital since 1981 in the
US, an average of five EU countries and the Nordic countries in our sample. Each graph
compares the model’s fitted value for these countries with (i) the simulated value if all policy
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Figure 3: Actual and predicted business R&D expenditure (Table 4, specification 6)
(a) Actual and predicted business R&D expenditure levels, 2006-2007
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(b) Actual and predicted change in business R&D expenditure, 2007 versus 1981
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variables (spending, taxes) had remained at their 1981 level, (ii) the simulated value if all
policy variables and wage pressure had remained at their 1981 level, and (iii) the simulated
value if all policy variables, wage pressure and human capital had remained at their 1981
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level. Individual country graphs are available upon request.
All three graphs underscore the importance of public policy, wage pressure and human
capital. As indicated by the lower line in Figure 3a, in the US business R&D investment in
2012 would have been only a little bit higher than in 1981 if these variables had remained
unchanged. The core EU5 countries would have realized only about 1/3 of the actual increase
in BERD if policy variables, wage pressure and human capital had remained at their 1981
level. The Nordic countries only about 50%. In this sense, Figure 4 is fully consistent with
our earlier findings in Figure 3. The observed policy and other variables were very important
for the evolution of business R&D investment in most countries. It seems again, though, that
in comparative perspective the Nordic countries also benefited strongly from the evolution
of the unobserved common factor. In the US its impact was minimal, especially so when we
consider the most recent years.
As to the relative contribution of the set of policy variables, the wage gap, and high
skilled human capital for the evolution of BERD, Figure 4 leaves no doubt that the latter
was the most important. In the US the increase of human capital contributed to more than
75% of the total increase in BERD. In the core EU that was almost 70%, in the Nordic
countries about 50%. Public innovation policy comes second in line, especially in the core
EU countries. In these countries, changes in policy accounted for a little more than 20%
of the observed increase in BERD since 1981. In the Nordic countries the contribution of
policy changes was about 13%, in the US about 9%. Finally, changes in the wage gap may
have contributed the least to change in business R&D investment. This conclusion holds in
particular for the US and the Nordic countries where fairly limited changes in wage pressure,
on average, had rather neutral e↵ects. Changes in the wage gap did matter, however, in the
core EU5. The focus on wage moderation in countries like the Netherlands, Austria and Italy
in particular had an important negative impact on BERD over time. Figure 4 shows that,
for the evolution of BERD, the stimulating e↵ect of public policy in the core EU5 countries
was entirely neutralized by the negative e↵ects of wage moderation.
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Figure 4: Counterfactual analysis: fitted and simulated model (Table 4, specification 6)
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4.3 Robustness test: alternative specification of the wage indicator
To construct our wage indicator, lnWAGE, in Section 3.1.2, we used data on the share of
private capital (↵), public capital ( ) and labour (1   ↵    ) in total income. Estimation
of a basic production function for the set of countries in our empirical analysis gave us the
required information. However, to show that our results are not sensitive to the exact choice
of the income shares, we also constructed an alternative wage indicator based on di↵erent (but
evenly realistic) output elasticities. More specifically, we set ↵ and   equal to respectively
0.30 and 0.10, which is in line with the results reported by Bom and Ligthart (2014), and
the resulting labour share to 0.6. Using these elasticities, we recalculated lnWAGE and
re-estimated all related specifications with the CCEP estimator. Results can be found in
Appendix B. For all specifications, results are similar to the ones in Table 4 and the same
conclusions apply. As an additional robustness check we took into account the empirical
observation that bargained wages tend to be lower the higher the unemployment rate (see
e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994; Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel, and Quintini, 2003). This may
somewhat bias our wage gap indicator. As a second robustness test, we controlled for this
by following Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007) and added the unemployment rate to our wage
indicator. Again, results are very similar to the ones reported in Table 411.
4.4 Direction of causation
The empirical results in Table 4 give proof of a long-run relationship between lnBERDit
and its determinants. To provide evidence that the long-run coe cients in Table 4 can be
interpreted as empirical causal e↵ects, we apply a test for the direction of caution based on
the approach of Eberhardt and Teal (2013) which builds on the discussion in Canning and
Pedroni (2008). From the Granger Representation Theorem (Engle and Granger, 1987) we
know that if there exists a cointegration relationship between the variables in the model, these
series can be represented in the form of a dynamic error correction model.
Equations (14)-(15) formalize this relationship for our empirical model. For notational
covenience, this is done under the assumption of 1 (r = 1) common factor, ft, and of 1 variable
included in Xit.
11Results using this alternative wage indicator are not reported here, but are available upon request.
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  lnBERDit = 1i + ↵1b"i,t 1 + ⇢1i ft + JX
j=1
 11j  lnBERDi,t j +
JX
j=1
 12j Xi,t j + ⌫1it,
(14)
 Xit = 2i + ↵2b"i,t 1 + ⇢2i ft + JX
j=1
 21j  lnBERDi,t j +
JX
j=1
 22j Xi,t j + ⌫2it.
(15)
where b"i,t 1 represents the ’disequilibrium term’. The cointegration test results from Table 4
show there is cointegration between (yit, Xit, ft). This implies that the ’disequilibrium term’
is constructed as b"it = lnBERDit    i   Xit     ift and that ft is included in equations
(14)-(15). As a proxy for ft and for b"it, we use the results of the PANIC cointegration testing
procedure which provides us respectively with bfpct and b✏pcit . Equations (14)-(15) further include
lagged di↵erences of the observable variables in the cointegrating relationship.
For a long-run relationship to exist between lnBERDit, Xit and ft, ↵1 or ↵2 must be
nonzero . If ↵1 6= 0 then Xit has a causal impact on lnBERDit; if ↵2 6= 0 then lnBERDit has
a causal impact on Xit. If both ↵1 and ↵2 are non-zero, Xit and lnBERDit determine each
other jointly. In the above example there are only two equations, as we have two variables in
the cointegration relationship. In our empirical analysis we will have k + 1 equations, with k
being the number of variables in Xit. Empirical estimates for ↵1, ↵2,...,↵k+1 are investigated
using standard t-ratios, given that all variables in the ECM regression are stationary12.
Results are presented in Table 5 for two lags (J = 2), but the same conclusions can be
drawns for one lag (J = 1). Due to the limited time series dimension of our data, we do not
consider extra lags. In Table 5, the first row of each specification refers to the estimation of b↵1,
while for all other rows, b↵2 is estimated with the dependent variable the variable mentioned in
the column ’Variable’. Table 5 shows that for each specification that we have estimated, Xit
has an impact on lnBERDit. This can be seen from the estimation of equation (14) in row 1
for each specification in Table 5. To be sure that the estimated impact is causal, equation (15)
is estimated for each element in Xit as a dependent variable. If the error correction term of
these equations is zero, then the corresponding x-variable has a causal impact on lnBERDit.
The results in Table 5 show that all results can be interpreted as empirical causal e↵ects as
12The disequilibrium term b"it constructed from specifications (1), (2), (3) and (5) is not stationary at the
5% significance level but still stationary at the 10% level for specifications (2) and (5). This implies that for
the ’direction of causation’ test based on specification (1) and (3) we should employ simulated critical values.
However, in our analysis we still use standard t-ratios with the reason being that the p-values of stationarity
of the disequilibrium term are very close to 10 % and that we are mainly interested in the specifications that
include our wage measure.
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no error correction term is significant when estimating equation (15).
As an additional check we allow the short term coe cients ( 11j ,  12j ,  21j and  22j) and
the error correction terms (↵1 and ↵2) in equations (14) and (15) to vary across countries.
Results for the ’direction of causation’ test when allowing for this heterogeneity can be found
in Table 6, where the mean group results are reported. When allowing for short-term het-
erogeneity across countries, conclusions on the direction of causation are somewhat di↵erent.
First, there is clear evidence that lnHERDit and lnBERDit determine each other jointly.
This implies that the coe cient on lnHERDit in our specifications should be interpreted as a
correlation and not as a causal e↵ect. Evidence of reverse causality is also present for lnV Ait
as is shown by the test results of specification (3), (5),(7) and (8). For PMRit, the test results
of specification (10) indicate a possible problem of reverser causality, although only at the 10
% significance level. Finally, it is also important to note that only in specification (7) there is
some indication that the coe cients onWAGEit could not be interpreted as causal. However,
this is only the case at the 10% level of significance. Moreover, all other specifications show
that the estimated e↵ect of WAGEit is causal.
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5 Conclusion
The wedge between private and social returns to the creation of knowledge and technology
justifies government involvement in the area of research and development. Nevertheless,
in the current environment of restoring sustainability of public finances and search for an
increasing e ciency of public policy, the question arises which policy options are most e↵ective
in stimulating private R&D investment. This paper therefore analyses the e↵ects of di↵erent
policies on aggregate business funded and performed R&D investment in a panel of 14 OECD
countries since 1981. Concerning traditional policy options, we find that tax incentives are
e↵ective. Public funding (subsidization) of R&D performed by firms can also be e↵ective if
subsidies are not too low nor too high. The optimal subsidization rate may be somewhere
between 6 and 10%. R&D performed within the government sector and within institutions of
higher education is basically neutral with respect to business R&D. We find no evidence for
crowding out nor for complementarity, which implies that each euro spent on R&D within the
government feeds through one-to-one in aggregate R&D. The higher education sector may,
however, indirectly be of great significance. This paper revealed human capital accumulation
at the tertiary level as the most important driver of business funded and performed R&D in
the OECD during the last decades.
One of the main contributions of this paper is its attention to the impact of wage formation
on business R&D investment. Conflicting hypotheses have been introduced in the literature,
but not yet systematically analysed. One hypothesis is that innovation and investment in
R&D benefit from low or moderate wages, since these are important for firm profitability,
which is a key condition for investment. Wage restraint is also important to convince firms
that rents from innovation will not be appropriated by the unions through higher wages.
The opposite hypothesis is that an excessive focus on wage moderation may kill incentives
to innovate. Wage moderation may for example increase the survival probability of the
least innovative firms and retard the process of creative destruction. Conversely, according
to this hypothesis, higher wage pressure may force firms to innovate as a key element in
their competitive strategy. Our empirical analysis favours the first hypothesis in fairly closed
economies and in economies with flexible labour markets. The Anglo-Saxon countries may be
the closest to this type. In highly open economies and economies with rigid labour markets,
however, rather the opposite holds and high wage pressure may encourage innovation. Many
European countries are more likely to match this type.
Our paper may also contribute to the macro R&D literature methodologically. More than
existing studies, we pay particular attention to the time series properties of the data. As most
variables in our empirical model are found to be non-stationary, we estimate a cointegrating
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relationship. Moreover, we also take into account the presence of cross-sectionally correlated
error terms, which we find to be induced by an unobserved (non-stationary) common factor
that drives private R&D spending. A sensible interpretation is that this common factor
reflects the worldwide level of technology and knowledge. To capture this, we adopt the
CCEP estimator of Pesaran (2006). We find that the standard fixed e↵ects estimator yields
spurious results.
The policy implications of our results include a warning against excessive wage moderation
in highly open economies with rigid labour markets. Even though this may promote employ-
ment in the short run, it may undermine the economy’s innovative capacity and productivity
in the long run. The fairly poor growth of business R&D investment in a country like the
Netherlands may illustrate this long-run disadvantage. Conversely, however, in our view our
findings provide no argument in favour of excessive wage pressure. In rigid labour markets the
loss of employment that excessive wages may cause in the short run, may persist in the longer
run due to for example hysteresis e↵ects in bad times. If promotion of business investment
in R&D is the objective, our paper suggests better alternatives, in particular tax incentives,
well-chosen innovation subsidies and the development of high skilled human capital.
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Appendix A Fixed e↵ects regression results
Table 7: FE regression results
Dependent variable: lnBERDit
Sample period: 1981-2012, 14 OECD countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Coe cient estimates
Explanatory variables
lnV Ait 1.069⇤⇤⇤ 1.014⇤⇤⇤ 1.080⇤⇤⇤ 1.114⇤⇤⇤ 1.103⇤⇤⇤ 1.030⇤⇤⇤ 1.058⇤⇤⇤ 0.963⇤⇤⇤ 1.120⇤⇤⇤ 1.013⇤⇤⇤
(0.124) (0.129) (0.127) (0.164) (0.167) (0.161) (0.174) (0.172) (0.175) (0.166)
lnBINDEXit 0.264⇤⇤ 0.275⇤⇤⇤ 0.256⇤⇤ 0.260⇤⇤ 0.129 0.189⇤ 0.252⇤⇤⇤ 0.291⇤⇤⇤ 0.150 0.127
(0.104) (0.104) (0.106) (0.105) (0.111) (0.102) (0.107) (0.105) (0.108) (0.105)
lnSUBSit 0.243⇤⇤⇤ 0.237⇤⇤⇤ 0.240⇤⇤⇤ 0.244⇤⇤⇤ 0.201⇤⇤⇤ 0.241⇤⇤⇤ 0.240⇤⇤⇤ 0.265⇤⇤⇤ 0.255⇤⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
lnGOV ERDit  0.182⇤⇤⇤  0.179⇤⇤⇤  0.179⇤⇤⇤  0.183⇤⇤⇤  0.115⇤⇤⇤  0.079⇤  0.163⇤⇤⇤  0.176⇤⇤⇤  0.216⇤⇤⇤  0.197⇤⇤⇤
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040)
lnHERDit 0.528⇤⇤⇤ 0.516⇤⇤⇤ 0.544⇤⇤⇤ 0.517⇤⇤⇤ 0.465⇤⇤⇤ 0.541⇤⇤⇤ 0.537⇤⇤⇤ 0.551⇤⇤⇤ 0.434⇤⇤⇤ 0.481⇤⇤⇤
(0.048) (0.048) (0.060) (0.054) (0.065) (0.060) (0.063) (0.062) (0.068) (0.066)
HCAPit  0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.000 -0.008  0.012⇤
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
OPENit 0.002 0.028⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.004)
lnWAGEit 0.076 0.186  1.738⇤⇤⇤ 0.078 1.302⇤⇤⇤
(0.179) (0.188) (0.340) (0.179) (0.282)
PMRit 0.123  0.456⇤⇤⇤
(0.095) (0.076)
PMR2it  0.043⇤⇤
(0.018)
lnSUBSit ⇤ low 0.453⇤⇤⇤
(0.049)
lnSUBSit ⇤medium 0.124⇤⇤⇤
(0.031)
lnSUBSit ⇤ high 0.106⇤⇤⇤
(0.035)
lnWAGEit ⇤OPENit 0.031⇤⇤⇤
(0.005)
lnWAGEit ⇤ PMRit  0.446⇤⇤⇤
(0.086)
lnWAGEit ⇤ epllow  0.689⇤
(0.415)
lnWAGEit ⇤ eplmiddle 0.129
(0.228)
lnWAGEit ⇤ eplhigh 0.124
(0.124)
lnWAGEit ⇤ anglo  0.809⇤⇤
(0.410)
lnWAGEit ⇤ euro 0.456⇤⇤
(0.202)
lnWAGEit ⇤ nordic  0.460⇤
(0.245)
Panic Cointegration test (one common factor)
ADF-GLS on bfpct -2.541 -2.635 -2.580 -2.538 -2.877 -2.909 -2.608 -2.736 -2.437 -2.589
[0.31] [0.27] [0.29] [0.31] [0.18] [0.17] [0.28] [0.23] [0.35] [0.29]
MW on b✏pcit -0.619 -1.325 -0.534 -0.492 -0.489 -1.469 -0.383 0.654 0.366 1.366⇤
[0.73] [0.91] [0.70] [0.69] [0.69] [0.93] [0.65] [0.26] [0.35] [0.09]
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. ⇤, ⇤⇤ and ⇤⇤⇤ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. For the panel cointegration test
results, the unit root test on the common factor bFt is a ADF-GLS test for a model with constant. The corresponding (simulated) p-values are reported in
square brackets. The unit root test on the estimated idiosyncratic errors b✏pcit is a MW test. The corresponding p-values are reported in square brackets
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Appendix B CCEP results with alternative wage indicator
based on di↵erent production function elastici-
ties
Table 8: CCEP regression results for (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10) for alternative
calculation of TFP and the wage gap
Dependent variable: lnBERDit
Sample period: 1981-2012, 14 OECD countries
(4’) (5’) (6’) (7’) (8’) (9’) (10’)
Coe cient estimates
Explanatory variables
lnV Ait 0.375 0.597⇤⇤ 0.554⇤⇤ 0.395 0.655⇤⇤⇤ 0.314 0.357
(0.249) (0.238) (0.267) (0.258) (0.230) (0.240) (0.248)
lnBINDEXit  0.171⇤⇤  0.160⇤ -0.093 -0.085  0.188⇤⇤  0.217⇤⇤⇤  0.146⇤
(0.086) (0.084) (0.093) (0.092) (0.022) (0.087) (0.081)
lnSUBSit 0.002 0.029 0.031 0.034 0.049⇤⇤ 0.050⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
lnGOV ERDit 0.067 0.068 0.092⇤⇤ 0.143⇤⇤⇤ 0.020 0.023 0.033
(0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.051) (0.042) (0.053) (0.050)
lnHERDit 0.100 -0.046 0.047 0.039 0.077 -0.015 0.007
(0.068) (0.064) (0.071) (0.071) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066)
HCAPit 0.092⇤⇤⇤ 0.058⇤⇤⇤ 0.065⇤⇤⇤ 0.093⇤⇤⇤ 0.044⇤⇤⇤ 0.062⇤⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
OPENit 0.012⇤⇤⇤
(0.004)
lnWAGEit -0.289 0.011  1.182⇤⇤⇤ -0.206 0.269
(0.195) (0.186) (0.413) (0.192) (0.404)
PMRit 0.419⇤⇤ -0.111
(0.198) (0.135)
PMR2it -0.045
(0.037)
lnSUBSit ⇤ low -0.055
(0.076)
lnSUBSit ⇤medium 0.070⇤⇤
(0.035)
lnSUBSit ⇤ high  0.080⇤⇤
(0.040)
lnWAGEit ⇤OPENit 0.013⇤⇤
(0.005)
lnWAGEit ⇤ PMRit  0.308⇤⇤
(0.151)
lnWAGEit ⇤ epllow  1.127⇤⇤⇤
(0.391)
lnWAGEit ⇤ eplmiddle 0.042
(0.432)
lnWAGEit ⇤ eplhigh -0.126
(0.239)
lnWAGEit ⇤ anglo -0.551
(0.413)
lnWAGEit ⇤ euro 1.215⇤⇤⇤
(0.322)
lnWAGEit ⇤ nordic 0.143
(0.282)
Panic Cointegration test (one common factor)
ADF-GLS on bfpct -0.812 -1.498 -2.043 -1.606 -2.254 -0.091 -0.289
[0.95] [0.81] [0.55] [0.77] [0.44] [0.99] [0.99]
MW on b✏pcit 1.949⇤⇤ 1.423⇤ 2.524⇤⇤⇤ 2.635⇤⇤⇤ 1.408⇤ 1.757⇤⇤ 3.125⇤⇤⇤
[0.03] [0.08] [0.01] [0.00] [0.08] [0.04] [0.00]
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. ⇤, ⇤⇤ and ⇤⇤⇤ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively. For the panel cointegration test results, the unit root test on the common factor bFt is a ADF-GLS
test for a model with constant. The corresponding (simulated) p-values are reported in square brackets. The unit
root test on the estimated idiosyncratic errors b✏pcit for di↵erent number of common factors r=1,2 is a MW test.
The corresponding p-values are reported in square brackets
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